Riccardo Domenico Saulle – Department of Economics, Maastricht University
Moderator: Johannes Emmerling – EIEE (RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment)
We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set (MSS). The MSS is de_ned for a general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. An MSS exists and, under minor continuity assumptions, it is also unique. The MSS generalizes and unifies various results from more specific applications. It coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games when this set is non-empty; with the set of stable matchings in the Gale-Shapley matching model; with the set of Pareto optimal allocations in the Shapley-Scarf housing matching model; with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network formation; with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in pseudo-potential games and infinite supermodular games; and with the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in several classes of two-player games.